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INTEGRITY IN GOVERNMENT
Lloyd Weinreb*
Others have direct experience with the problems of promoting
integrity in government and policing its lapses. I shall leave that
difficult subject to them. I want to make some comments about what
we mean by integrity in the context of government, and to suggest that
the circumstances of governance today weaken its meaning. Few
disagree that integrity is one of the qualities most to be valued in
public officials. We use the notion of integrity expansively as a
general, all-purpose yardstick against which to measure public
conduct. Yet it is an elusive concept, especially in relation to
government and government officials.
The least that integrity requires of a public official is that he or she
not be corrupt in obvious ways: soliciting or accepting a bribe, or
accepting a gift or favor in return for official action. Such conduct is
generally criminal; so the added fact that it displays a lack of integrity
is beside the point. So also, integrity requires that one not take some
action or fail to take some action because of a perceived benefit to
oneself, even if the benefit is incidental and not a reward. But again,
profiting from a conflict of interest also is generally subject to criminal
or regulatory sanctions. Although we sometimes have to draw painful
distinctions between what is and what is not within bounds, the
principle is reasonably clear. Formal mechanisms for preserving
integrity in government go no further than corruption and near
corruption of this kind. There is also much conduct for which official
sanctions are out of the question and which we should hesitate to call
corrupt, but which nevertheless raises issues of integrity. It is in this
area that we are most in need of a better understanding.
The meaning of integrity that comes easiest to mind is Polonius's
advice to Laertes: "This above all, to thine own self be true."'
Authenticity-being what one is, without deceit or dissembling-is
surely at the core of integrity. Adopting that meaning, John Rawls
identified the virtues of integrity as "truthfulness and sincerity,
lucidity and commitment."2 They are, he said, "virtues of form" and
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1. William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Hamlet Prince of Denmark act I, sc. 3.
2. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 519 (1973).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
consistent with great wickedness.3 For that reason, he called them
"secondary" virtues.4 With respect to government, at any rate, that
diminishes them too much. Integrity in government is not a large
matter for a despot. He may be benign or malevolent, but because
what he does is not dependent on his subjects' wishes, so far as
matters of governance are concerned, integrity has for him only
instrumental value. It is quite otherwise for a democratic government.
For it, integrity enables, and a lack of integrity undermines, its
democratic nature. Integrity, as Rawls insists, does not guarantee
right conduct. Nevertheless, for all the same reasons that recommend
democracy, integrity ranks among a democratic government's primary
virtues.
A democratic government has an obligation arising from its
democratic nature to practice authenticity toward its citizens, those to
whom it is responsible. I do not suggest that government should be
transparent in all things. If we want to make integrity a virtue, we
ought not set the standard so high that it is unattainable as a practical
matter. Some governmental responsibilities, in some circumstances,
depend on secrecy, even, at times, dissembling and pretense. I should
state the matter this way: integrity requires that government not
conceal or dissemble simply in order to secure the citizens' approval,
or to avoid their disapproval, of what it does. Deception is
permissible only if it is necessary to serve an end that is or would be
approved, and only if the case can conscientiously be made that the
deception itself would be approved were it made known. That is a
difficult and troubling distinction to draw. Hypotheticals - the
subjunctive mode-are treacherous. "Would approve" too easily
becomes "would approve if they were right-thinking." Efforts to
avoid criticism or disapproval are too easily rationalized on the basis
that right-thinking persons would not criticize or disapprove. But the
distinction I have in mind marks the difference between a provisional
lack of authenticity in order to advance the public good, on one hand,
and a lack of authenticity to serve one's own political fortunes, on the
other.
I should add another, less obvious criterion. Preparing for this
afternoon, I asked myself what examples of government action exhibit
the greatest lapse from integrity. I came back again and again to
experiments involving dangerous, potentially fatal interventions
affecting specially selected, unknowing human subjects: exposure to
radiation, withholding treatment for syphilis, inoculation with the
influenza virus, even withholding orange juice from infants in order to
observe the symptoms of scurvy.' Although I believe that such
3. See id.
4. Id. at 520.
5. See Ed Williams, In the Nature of Science: How Modern Medicine Confronted
its Inhumane Past, Charlotte Observer, Aug. 31, 1997, at 4G.
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conduct is profoundly immoral, it is not self-evidently so. There is a
respectable ethical view that might apply a utilitarian calculus and
defend some such practices as instrumental to the good. Nevertheless,
practiced by the government on some of its citizens, it is to be
condemned as lacking integrity.
It may seem trivial in relation to such gross immorality to
emphasize the lack of integrity. But it is only this lack of integrity
which makes the case against the government clear. A government
may not secretly single out some of those who are governed for
especially harmful treatment-or for that matter, favorable
treatment-even if it is thought to benefit the public good generally.
If a case can be made for such treatment (which I doubt), it must in
fact be made. As Rawls noted, having integrity does not guarantee a
moral course of conduct. Nor does pursuing the good as one sees it
excuse a lack of integrity-although I should add that if the moral
principles themselves are not a sham, there is an affinity between
morality and integrity.
That is a skeletal view of what I think integrity in government
means. The implications extend beyond extreme cases like the secret
experiments. They also include failure to disclose fully and
forthrightly the nature and effects of ordinary, ongoing programs -the
regular business of government-that affect people unequally. Each
of us will have his own examples. Those that come to mind for me
include the brutal, degrading conditions in many American prisons;
prolonged detention of persons who may be subject to deportation,
also in degrading conditions; and the withholding of promised medical
benefits from veterans. Or, on the other side of the ledger, the
granting of special subsidies or tax breaks to specially favored groups.
Such practices are usually not wholly concealed. But disclosure that is
deliberately obscured by misleading statistics and trumped-up
explanations and justifications also-whatever other ethical
judgments apply-bespeaks a lack of integrity. There is a lack of
integrity in the government's current ad hoc, evasive, euphemistic
defense of the detention of persons without access to a lawyer-or
indeed to anyone to act in their behalf-and their subjection to
torture, by whatever name it is called, assertedly in connection with
the so-called war on terrorism.6 Whatever would be the public
response were these practices forthrightly acknowledged-I recognize
that judgments will differ-the government's avoidance of informed
debate lacks integrity.
There are several recent developments in the conditions of politics
in this country that might be thought to serve the values of integrity in
government by increasing the transfer of information in both
6. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Threats and Responses: Detainees; Guantanamo
Prisoners Seek to See Families and Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 2002, at A22.
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directions between those who govern and those who are governed, but
that have, in fact, done integrity a disservice. Increasingly, it seems to
me, we are able to preserve integrity in government as an ideal only
by making its content thinner and thinner in practice. I have in mind
the explosion of means of public communication, the increased use of
polling and the rise of special interest groups.
In private life, we are rarely called on to declare our commitments
explicitly. Mostly, we display them over time by our conduct. We are
able to reflect, reconsider, even to change our minds. For public
officials or persons seeking public office, however, the situation is
different. The insatiable appetite of news media-mainly television-
for new stories, the intense competition among networks, and the
advent of round-the-clock news channels have put public officials
under intense, unceasing scrutiny. They are expected to declare their
views on current issues and events on a daily, almost hourly, basis.
And, attentive to the nature of the medium, they express their views
in short, easily digested phrases and slogans-sound bites-without
qualifications, reservations, or careful analysis of any kind. Inevitably,
they think about what to say and leave serious consideration of what
to think for later. Forthrightness and commitment are replaced by
"spin." Walter Mondale's honest declaration in the presidential
campaign of 1984 that it might be necessary to raise taxes is recalled
not as an example of integrity, but as a cautionary tale.7
Nor is the retreat to inauthentic, uninformative public discourse
limited to political campaigns. Political appointees-judges and high
government officials-are subjected to a confirmation process that is
supposed to provide a basis for senatorial judgment but has become
on one side an exercise in meaningless, fawning admiration and, on
the other, a game of Get the Guest.8 An appointee does not prepare
by working out a careful statement of her views. Rather, she is
prepared by "handlers," as they are called, who are interested not in
what she believes, but in what she should or should not say. No one is
in doubt about how to conduct herself: follow your handlers' script,
avoid any direct response, and deny having ever thought about any
matter of any consequence.
Once in office, an official whose views might otherwise be of
interest is expected above all to be a team player. We have recently
had an example of forthright dissent. National Security Adviser
Condoleeza Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell openly
disagreed with the President's position about race-based affirmative
action.9 Would anyone say that public debate would have been
7. See Hedrick Smith, Reagan's Wintry Budget Talk Numbs Congress, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 7, 1984, at B18.
8. See Jeffrey Rosen, Obstruction of Judges, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 2002, § 6
(Magazine), at 38.
9. Brent Staples, Pondering Condoleezza Rice's Affirmative Action Problem-
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improved, or that the integrity of the government's stance would have
been greater, if they had been persuaded to remain silent? The
example is so notable because it is so rare.
A second change that has depreciated integrity in government is the
unremitting polling by candidates for office and persons in office.
One's approval rating is tested and updated constantly and carefully
broken down into categories: age, gender, race, and anything else that
comes to mind. It is na've to suppose that such polling is intended
only to help an elected official keep in touch with his constituents.
Rather, it is intended to keep him in office, which is a different matter.
How little it has to do with integrity is indicated by President Clinton's
apparent reliance on his pollster-in-chief to decide whether to lie
publicly about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky,1 ° surely the
nadir of this practice. What is so startling is not consulting a poll as
such, but the fact that even so personal a moral decision is put to that
test.
The third development is the rise of special interest groups, for
whom a single issue excludes all others: the gun lobby, retired
persons, and advocates or opponents of such topics as capital
punishment, women's reproductive freedom or the right to life, and
affirmative action. Again, the effort is not to encourage public
discourse by communicating the group's views and the strength of
their commitment. Rather, it is to hold public officials hostage. The
predictable reaction of officials who are thus threatened is to avoid an
honest statement of their position and, so far as possible, to temporize
and equivocate.
Whether or not official government policy is at stake, such conduct
has become routine, simply the way public officials behave and are
expected to behave. It is not, I think, because public officials
individually have less integrity today than in the past. I do think,
however, that what passes for integrity in government and public life
is diminished. There is less expectation of honest, forthright,
committed behavior, and so we take less notice when it is absent. We
are used to spin, to handlers, to glib phrases and euphemisms as part
of government. The likely consequences for democratic society are
not encouraging.
and Mine, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 2003, at A18.
10. Maureen Dowd, The Way We Are, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 2003, at A13.
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